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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Volume XXXIV November, 1945 Number 1
THE FREE SPEECH SAFEGUARD FOR
LABOR PICKETING
By IRA SCHLvSSFLBERG*
PART Two*
In Part One we took into consideration the attitude of the
eourts and of the legislatures toward Labor activities broadly
and toward picketing specifically, mostly prior to 1937. We
viewed the melting of the early distrust and animosity toward
Labor activities into a feeling of tolerance, still intermingled
with strains of the older hatred.
Despite State and Federal legislation designed to protect
Labor and its diverse activities from the inroads of the dreaded
injunction, there was not yet an authoritative, binding decision
protecting the weapon of picketing; a decision by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
There was a dilemma, an extremely vexing situation where-
by certain picketing activities would be enjoined in a State
Court although the Federal Court within the same State would
refuse an injunction. One State would enjoin an activity while
the same facts would not warrant an injunction in a sister State.
In 1937 the first outstanding case enveloping picketing in
a strong protective cape came before the United States Supreme
Court in S'eni v. Tile Layers Protective Union.' The issue there
was whether certain novel provisions of the Wisconsin Labor
A.B., New York University; LL.B., Columbia University.
Formerly connected with Columbia Law Review. Member: New
York and Federal Bars and practitioner before various Federal
Agencies. Address: 40 Wall Street, New York 5, N. Y.
'* Part One of this article appeared in the May, 1945, issue of
the Kentucky Law Journal. (Please note the change in the
author's address since the publication of Part One.)
301 U. S. 468 (1937).
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Code2 authorizing the giving of publicity to Labor disputes,
declaring lawful the right to peacefully picket, and prohibiting
the Courts from enjoining such conduct, violated either the
Due Process or the Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The Union, seemingly protected by the statute, peacefully
picketed Senn's place of business and proclaimed him "Unfair
To Union Labor," solely because of his refusal to sign a union
contract prohibiting him, as a master, from personally working
with the tools of his trade. The State Court, over the objeetion
of Sein that such a decision would deprive him of his livelihood
without due process of law, upheld the Labor Code and pro-
tected the picketing.
Brandeis, speaking for a majority of the Supreme Court,
upheld the State Court and the validity of the statute.3 Although
the facts at hand required him to go no further, he chose to
continue and thereby laid down his now famous dictum.
"Clearly the means which the statute authorizes-picketing
and publicity-are not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Members of a union might, without special statutory authoriza-
tion by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for
freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
The State may, in the exercise of its police power, regulate the
methods and means of publicity as well as the use of public
streets."'
Further on, Brandeis, mindful of the great number of pre-
vious decisions restricting Labor's right to publicize a strike,
distinguishes between "lawful" and "unlawful persuasion."
"Truax v. Corrigani is not applicable. The statute there in ques-
tion was deemed to have been applied to legalize conduct which was
not simply peaceful picketing, not 'lawful persuasion or inducing',
not 'a mere appeal to the sympathetic aid of would-be customers by
a simple statement of the facts of the strike and a request to with-
hold patronage.' It consisted of libelous attacks and abusive epithets
against the employer and his friends; libelous and disparaging state-
ments against the plaintiff's business; threats and intimidation di-
rected against customers and employees."
From this dictutm, impotent as it may have seemed at the
time, the proponents of Labor at once rationalized that the right
I 'Wis. Laws 1931, c. 376; Laws 1935, c. 551, §§ 103.53 to 103.83.
This statute was modeled upon the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
'The minority consisted of Justices Butler, Sutherland, Van
Devanter and McReynolds.
1301 U. S. at 478.
6257 U. S. 312 (1921).
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to picket now enjoyed the full protection of the First and of
the Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. 6 They con-
cluded that picketing was now to be universally allowed as an
exercise of the Constitutional right of free expression.
Were this theory correct and the Senn. dictum, given its
full meaning, picketing would cease to be a prima facie tort
(with the burden to prove justification placed upon Labor).
Picketing was now to be a freely exercisable right with its
opponents having the burden of proving a misuse of that right.
The presumption would be in favor of validity of the acts. It
would also follow that the propriety of restrictions upon the
right to peacefully picket would more often be a question for
the Federal Courts since Labor could obtain a review of such
restrictions by claiming the violation of a Constitutional
guarantee. 7
In 1937 the Supreme Court had already upheld the consti-
tutionality of and somewhat broadened the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The Court had also disagreed with the established
theory of inalienable rights in property and the argument
against Federal control of interstate Labor matters.s With an
increasingly friendly Federal Judiciary, Legislature, and Exec-
utive, the future outlook for Labor seemed promising.
Labor had not reckoned, however, with the distinctions a
court may draw when particularizing a general proposition of
law such as the dicthm of the Senn case. Despite the institution
of a trend, many State Courts, although citing the Senn case for
the picketing-free speech proposition,0 enjoined picketing as of
old by distinguishing between a qualified right of free speech
"The First Amendment as a protection against Federal encroach-
ment and the Fourteenth as against the States.
-West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937); Virginia
Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U. S. 515 (1937); Lauf
v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938). This particular aspect of the
Senn case is discussed in (1937) 37 COL. L. REv. 1227; (1937) 6 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 474; (1937) 6 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 137; (1938) 22 MnIN.
L. REv. 271; (1938) Wisc. L. REV. 170.
'Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301
U. S. 142 (1937); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U. S. 103 (1937);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. I (1937).
'People v. Harriss, 104 Colo. 386, 91 P. (2d) 989, 122 A. L. R.
1034 (1939); San Angelo v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 139 S. W.
(2d) 843 (Texas, 1940); Macy's Furs, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N. Y. 331, 26
N. E. (2d) 279 (1940).
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and an absolute right of property.10 These courts did not attempt
to point out that the picketing-free speech identification was
pure dictum by Brandeis. Although accepting the doctrine, they
strove to find new ways-to circumvent its effect. Using a juris-
prudential hierarchy of values, they placed the right of free
speech upon a lower step than the right to property, and there-
fore, in a conflict between the two, the lower gave way to the
higher.1 ' Many courts, however, either refused or merely ne-
glected to take notice of the dictum of the Senn case and contin-
ued to enjoin where they had enjoined before. 12
With such a setting, on April 22, 1940, the 'United States
Supreme Court decided both Carlson v. Californiat" and Thoirn-
hill v. Alabama."
In the Carlson case, the United States Supreme Court de-
clared a county ordinance to be an unconstitutional prohibition
of the worker's right to publicize his situation, since it forbade
all picketing if solely for the purpose of interfering with the
business of another. The State Code, assailed in the companion
Thornhill case, forbade loitering, picketing, discussion, and all
forms of publicity concerning a Labor situation while in the
vicinity of the conflict. Thornhill peacefully picketed and when
apprehended, claimed that the Code was an unconstitutional
violation of his rights of peaceful assembly, free speech, and
petition for redress.
The U. S. Supreme Court, in deciding the two cases, empha-
' Crosby v. Rath, 136 Ohio St. 352, 25 N. E. (2d) 934 (1940)
(cert. denied sub nom); Rath v. Crosby, 312 U. S. 690 (1941); Mit-
nick v. Furniture Workers Union, 125 N. J. Eq. 142, 4 A. (2d) 277
(1939).
1 1Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 371
I1. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939), aff'd sub nom Milk Wagon Drivers'
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941). Denver
Local Union v. Perry Truck Lines, 106 Colo. 25, 101 P. (2d) 436
(1940) ; cf. Ellingsen v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, 377 Ill. 76, 35
N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
"Lyle v. Local 452, 174 Tenn. 222, 124 S. W. (2d) 701 (1939);
Roth v. Local Union 605, 216 Ind. 363, 24 N. E. (2d) 280 (1939);
Carter v. Bradshaw, 138 S. W. (2d) 187 (Texas 1940). Feldman v.
Weiner, 173 Misc. 461, 17 N. Y. S. (2d) 730 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Euclid
Candy Corp. v. Somma, 174 Misc. 19, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 382 (Sup. Ct.
1940). cf. Katzman & Co. v. Kirkman, 18 N Y. S. (2d) 903 (Sup. Ct.
1940).
" 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
1 310 U. S. 88 (1940).
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sized the identification of picketing with free speech. In the
(Oarlswo case 15 it was said:
" ...publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word
of mouth or by banner, must now be regarded as within that
liberty of communication which is secured to every person by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State."
Again in the Thornlzill case the court envelopes most actions
of Labor during a Labor dispute in the protective cloak of the
Constitution when it says :16
" ...the dissemination of information concerning a labor
dispute must be regarded as within that area of free discussion
guaranteed by the Constitution. Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496;
Schneider v. State. 308 U. S. 147, 155. 162-3. See Senn v. Tile
Layers Union, 301 U. S. 468, 478 .... Free discussion concerning
the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes ap-
pears to us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of
the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of
modern industrial society."1
7
Justice Murphy points out the origin of the picketing-free
speech identification when he says:
"We concur in the observation of Mr. Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court in Senn's case (301 U. S. at 478): 'Mem-
bers of a union might, without special statutory authorization
by a State, make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom
of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.'
"It is true that the rights of employers and employees to
conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others for
a share in the products, of industry are subject to modification
or qualification in the interests of the society in which they
exist. This is but an instance of the power of the State to set
the limits of permissible contest open to industrial combatants.
See Mr. Justice Brandeis in 254 U. S. at 488. It does not follow
that the State in dealing with the evils arising from industrial
disputes may impair the effective exercise of the right to dis-
cuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public con-
cern. A contrary conclusion could be used to support abridgment
of freedom of speech and of the press concerning almost every
matter of importance to society."'"
id. at 113.
' id. at 102.
17 Cf. Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 160 (1939) where the
Court says that "The streets are natural and proper places for the
dissemination of information and opinion, and one is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression abridged in appropriate
places... "
" As for the question of supplying public information, the Court
further says, 310 U. S. at 104: "The range of activities prescribed by
§ 3448, whether characterized as picketing or loitering or otherwise,
embraces nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those
interested-including the employees directly affected-may en-
lighten the public on the nature and causes of a labor dispute. The
safeguarding of these means is essential to the securing of an in-
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However, by invalidating § 3448 of the Alabama Code since
it would prohibit a single, silent, peaceful picket and does not
contain exceptions
" . . .based upon either the number of persons engaged in
the proscribed activity, the peaceful character of their demeanor,
the nature of their dispute with an employer, or the restrained
character and accurateness of the terminology used in notifying
the public of the facts of the dispute."'9
the Court protects a vestige of States' Rights by using language
implying that a State may prohibit picketing if the provisions
of the enactment are not "sweeping and inexact," and do per-
mit picketing under these enumerated exceptions.
The Court emphasizes that the States retain their Police
Power to control and even to forbid peaceful sounding words
wlere the surrounding circumstances show acts of violence. This
is contained in the exact words of the decision. 2 1, The fear of
future violence, however, may not always be used as a reason
for the wholesale denial of all peaceful Labor activities.2'
Many persons regarded the Carlson and Thornidll cases as
violent condemnations of any statute which would restrict all
free speech during Labor disputes, without exceptions. 2 2
formed and educated public opinion with respect to a matter which
'is of public concern. It may be that effective exercise of the means
of advancing public knowledge may persuade some of those reached
to refrain from entering into advantageous relations with the business
establishment which is the scene of the dispute. Every expression of
opinion on matters that are important has the potentiality of induc-
ing action in the interests of one rather than another group in society.
But the group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanc-
tions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public interest
merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to take
action inconsistent with its interests. Abridgement of the liberty
of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of
substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity
to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market
of public opinion. We hold that the danger of injury to an industrial
concern is neither so serious nor so imminent as- to justify the
sweeping prescription of freedom of discussion embodied in § 3448."
id, at 99.
"id. at 103. "It is true that the rights of employers and em-
ployees to conduct their economic affairs and to compete with others
for a share in the products of industry are subject to some modifica-
tion or qualification in the interests of the society in which they
exist."
"id. at 105.
- Blanket restrictions. Hotel & Restaurant Employees' Alliance
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 236 Wis. 329, 294 N. W.
632 (1940), rehearing denied, 295 N. W. 634 (1941), affd, 315 U. S.
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These cases were also cited as holding inviolate the picket-
ing-free speech identification. Subsequently, almost any injunc-
tion against picketing which restricted free discussion, was
termed a Constitutional violation. 23 .
The words of Brandeis in the Sew? case and the holdings
of the Carlsoi2 and Thornihill cases greatly changed the older
theories concerning picketing.2 4 However, the Supreme Court
had not as yet spoken of power to set aside picketing injunctions
issued by State Courts. ' '
The first major decision restricting the power of the States
to issue picketing injunctions is found in A. F. of L. v. Swing.2 6
The case held that under the Constitution, peaceful picketing
could not be enjoined despite the absence of a controversy be-
tween the employer and his own employees. The Court called
picketing "a form of speech" and found that any barrier to
peaceful picketing was a prohibition to free speech and would
not be allowed. This in itself was an application of the Senn
doctrine to the injunction field. Furthermore, a "Labor dis-
pute," in the old sense, did not have to exist.
Unions had always maintained that they possessed the
right to peacefully attempt to organize establishments which
437 (1942); Ex Parte Bell, 19 Cal. (2d) 488, 100 P. (2d) 339 (1942),
rehearing denied, 122 P. (2d) 22 (1942). See (1942) Wxsc. L. REv.
115.
' Midland Steel Products v. N. L. R. B., 113 F. (2d) 800 (C.C.A.
6th, 1940); Book Tower Garage v. Local 415, 295 Mich. 580, 295 N. W.
320 (1940) (picketing is not a tort per se); People v. De Julis, 174
Misc. 836, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 995 (1940) (picketing in a park without
a license permitted); Continental Box Co. v. NLRB, 113 F. (2d) 93
(C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
See Conflicting Decision On Commercial Character Of Union
Leaflets (1938) 6 INT. JuRiD. Ass'N BULL. 102; (1942) 3 ALA. LAW-
YER 454; (1942) 17 CAL. S. B. J. 268; (1942) 10 INT. JuRID. ASS'N.
BULL. 69.
" It should be noted that the Wisconsin Labor Code involved in
the Senn case legalized picketing and connected activities. The stat-
utes of the Thornhill and Carlson cases, Alabama Code in the former
and Shasta County, Calif. local ordinance in the latter, made such
Labor activities illegal. Therefore the Court approached the pro-
blem in 1940 from a direction opposite to that of 1937.
' Even after the Senn, Carlson and Thornhill cases, many courts
still enjoined peaceful picketing because a criminal conviction was
not involved. They used the theory of unlawful activity. Silver
Dollar Bake Shop v. Weissman, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 744 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Back v. Kaufman, 175 Misc. 169, 22 N.Y.S. (2d) 449 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
See (1942) 3 ALABAMA LAWYER 454; (1941) 39 MIcH. L. REV. 582.
" 312 U. S. 321 (1941), rehearing denied, 312 U. S. 715 (1941).
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were in competition with unionized businesses. This argument
was validated by the Supreme Court in the American tcCl
Fondries case,2 7 but most Courts remained steadfast in the
belief that there could be no "Labor dispute" in the absence
of a bona fide employees' strike at the location of the Labor
activity. This tended to terminate almost entirely any sort of
organizational campaign, whether carried on to further the
aims and enlarge the membership and jurisdiction of the union,
or even for the less objectionable end of protecting past gains
by reducing unfair competition of a non-union employer whose
lower labor costs would allow him to undersell a competing union
employer. - s
The holding of the Swing case forced the reluctant State
Courts to reform their opinions as to the necessity of the exist-
ence of a "Labor dispute."
The Aleadowmoor case29 swung the pendulum in the oppo-
site direction and once again placed a limitation upon the
"inalienable right to picket" by holding that a State Court
could enjoin all Labor activity, including peaceful picketing,
upon proof that there had been previous acts of violence.3"
The majority was of the opinion that such violence could more
easily be restrained by an equity court than by the peace officer,
while the minority, Justices Douglas, Reed, and Black, strongly
-,257 U. S. 184 (1921). Taft, concurred with by Brandeis, said:
"To render this combination at all effective, employees must make
their combination extend beyond one shop. It is helpful to have as
many as may be in the same trade in the same community united,
because in the competition between employers they are bound to be
affected by the standards of wages of their trade in the neighbor-
hood. Therefore, they may use all lawful propaganda to enlarge
their membership and especially among those whose labor at lower
wages will injure their whole guild."
2'By 1941 only 19 states had directly spoken on the question of
the legality of picketing in the absence of a strike. Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington held such
picketing to be illegal per se. The remaining six, California, Colo-
rado, Montana, New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin protected the right
to picket in such non-strike situations.
-Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dair-
ies, Inc., 312 U. S. 287 (1941). In the state court the case was re-
ported in 371 Ill. 377, 21 N. E. (2d) 308 (1939).
" Many cases have held picketing to be either violent or non-
violent after saying that the line which separates free expressions
from coercive violent expressions is obscure. See (1942) 40 MicH.
L. REV. 1200.
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maintained that the prevention of violence should be an inci-
dent of police protection since the peace officers could simul-
taneously protect the pickets' right to free speech and stop all
unlawful conduct. The dissenters pointed out that an equity
injunction, to be capable of practical application, could not
easily or clearly draw a distinction between the lawful and the
unlawful activities. 3 ' The majority did, however, reaffirm the
identification of picketing with free speech, continuing the trend
initiated by Brandeis in the Senn case, 32 but it also permitted
the right of free speech to be enjoined in the interest of the
public welfare even where little danger of future violence was
shown.3  This was a serious setback to Labor. Jurisprudential
theory usually considers the rights granted by the Constitution
to be on a higher level than mere lawful acts. A court should not
permit, therefore, any restraint upon such civil liberties either
because they are being exercised together with an act of rio-
lenee, or are being exercised with a background of past violence.
It would be correct to permit the exercise of the right while
squashing the violence; not squashing both. This reasoning the
Court disregarded, possibly remembering a case in 191134 where
it had been held that since words having the effect of force were
"verbal acts." they were not to be protected under the guise of
free speech, but could be enjoined as if they were physical acts.33
'See FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930)
(October, 1942) 3 ALABAMA LAWYER 454. For cases in point see also(1942) 17 CAL. S. B. J. 268; (1939) 53 HARV. L. REv. 487; (1942) 40
MICH. L. REV. 1200.
2 After the Meadowmoor case, State Courts were flooded with
requests for blanket injunctions backed up by full pleadings of
violence. One of great interest is Euclid Candy Co. v. International
Longshoremen, 49 Cal. App. (2d) 137 (1942).
'As pointed out supra under the discussion of the events sub-
sequent to the Senn case, the practice of many courts was to place
the right to free speech on a lower level in the hierarchy of rights
than the right to property. In that way, picketing could be enjoined
when it interfered with an employer's right to do business (right to
property or public welfare).
'Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911).
' Quite interesting is a segment of testimony of Mr. Samuel
Gompers, President of the A. F. L., in A. F. L. v. Buck's Stove &
Rance Co., 33 App. D. C. 83 (1909), appeal dismissed, 219 U. S. 581
(1911), because questions in the case had become moot. Mr. Gom-
pers quotes from an editorial written by him:
"A sympathetic boycott is as legal and legitimate as a
sympathetic strike. Just as men may strike for any reason, or
without any reason at all, so may they suspend dealings with
KENTUcKY LAW JOURNAL
Under the Meadownoor case, a State Court would be free
to enjoin all, even peaceful picketing, if the facts showed the
activity to be closely associated with past or present acts of
violence. The decision, to be expected, raised uncertainty as to
the requisite degree of connection between the picketing and
the acts of violence. 30
The case may be a fine example of judicial self-restraint.
In holding that it would not reverse the State Court's decision
because the picketing was associated with a background of vio-
lence having a coercive effect and a fear of future misconduct,
the Supreme Court refused to accept a revisory power over the
State practice, so long as it was satisfied that the State was not
merely attempting to evade the constitutional guarantees. The
Court indicated, however, that it did not intend to sustain a
complete ban upon all dissemination of information by a union.
If the union sought to use means outside the limits of violence,
such as newspaper advertisements, personal discussion or the
radio, to publicize the fact of its Labor dispute, the Court would
keep its doors open to prevent the issuance of an injunction.
merchants or others for any reason or for no reason at all ....
boycotters never do confine themselves to moral suasion and
appeal; that they resort to threats, intimidation, and coercion,
No one pretends for a moment that it would be proper for a
boycotter to approach a merchant and say, 'You must join us in
suspending all dealings with that employer, on pain of having
your house set on fire.' This would be an unlawful threat and
people who would try to enlist others in their campaign by
threats of this character would certainly be guilty of criminal
conspiracy. Do boycotters use threats? ... Our worst enemies
do not contend that they do. Let Judge Taft, who issued the
sweeping anti-boycotting injunction, be a witness on this point.
He said: 'As usually understood, a boycott is a combination of
many to cause a loss to one person by coercing others, against
their will, to withdraw from him their beneficial interests
through threats that, unless those others do so, the many will
cause similar loss to them.' . . . a man has a right to threaten
that which he has a right to carry out. You may tell a man
that, if he does a certain thing, you will never speak to him or
call at his house. This is a threat, but it is a threat that you
have a right to make. Why? Because you have a right to do
what you threaten. The same thing is strictly true of boycot-
ting. A man may be coerced by actual force, by the threat of
force, or by indirect means which the law cannot and does not
prohibit. Coercion by a threat to suspend dealings is in the same
category with coercion through a threat to cease friendly inter-
course.'"
-That punishment for contempt may violate the free speech
guarantee was first decided in Bridges v. State of California, 314
U. S. 252 (1941).
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The Court's theory was to hold supreme and inviolate the right
to free speech necessary in a Labor dispute, btt to insist that
such free speech be exercised in an atmosphere devoid of threats
of violence. It is because of this that the Meadowmoor case is
placed in the same category as the Sen, Thordt ill, and Carlson
case,, all being proponents of the picketing-free speech doctrine.
The very next case to closely link picketing with free speech
was A. P. of L. v. Swibg.Y The question before the Supreme
Court was whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
discussion was infringed by the Common Law policy of a State
in forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing
merely because no immediate employer-employee relationship
existed between the pickets and the employer being picketed.
The union, in its attempt to unionize a beauty shop owned
by Swing, had picketed with allegedly false banners and libelous
material. The lower court banned all picketing and discussion,
since some of the pickets had never been employed by Swing.
When the case reached the Supreme Court, 'Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority, called the ban an in-
fringement upon the right to free speech, saying:
"A state cannot exclude working men from peacefully exer-
cising the right of free communication by drawing the circle of
economic competition between employers and workers so small
as to contain only an employer and those directly employed by
him, The interdependence of economic interest of all engaged
in the same industry had become a commonplace. The right of
free communication cannot therefore be mutilated by denying it
to the workers, in a dispute with an employer, even though they
are not in his employ."
In effect, this opinion finds it unconstitutional for a State
to deny to workers the right to peacefully picket in any situa-
tion, where picketing is not connected with violence or libel
and/or threats thereof, the usual employer-employee relation
not being a prerequisite to lawfulness. The Norris-La Guardia
Aet 1 4 had forbid Federal Courts to grant injunctions against
picketing where the sole ground was the absence of a dispute
between the employer and his own employees. By virtue of the
Suing case, this injunctive relief was no longer validly obtain-
able from a State Court.
The Courts of New York had held, even prior to the Swing
ease, that an employer-employee relationship was not a pre-
312 U. S. 321 (1941).
SSection 113C.
L. J.-2
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requisite of the right to picket. "9 This, however, had been the
rule of the minority states. The Swing ease established the New
York rule as the law of the land.
The decision does not preclude an injunction of picketing
where the acts of the pickets are libelous. It is difficult, however,
to understand how the usual sign "This Firm Is Unfair To
Organized Labor" could be termed libelous, when it is recalled
that the employee is thereby using his only practical means to
inform the public that in his opinion this employer had dealt
-unfairly with his employees. It would be empty indeed if the
rights to picket and to utilize placards and statements were not
protected by the constitutional right of freedom of expression.
In his opinion in the Swing case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
had said nothing concerning the necessity of the existence of an
actual strike in order to legalize picketing. It would still seem
permissible for employees to continue to perform their labors
for their employer and to picket the establishment during free
hours. However, by not requiring the pickets to be present or
former employees of the picketed employer, Justice Frankfurter
strongly implied that a strike was unnecessary and that picket-
ing could exist independent of a strike. Many jurisdictions
reasoned in this way and permitted such picketing. 40 Moreover,
some States used this case as authority to allow all forms of sec-
ondary picketing.4 1
The Supreme Court of Washington decided O'Neil v. Bild-
ing Service Employees Un1ion 42 in 1941 after the Swing case,
thereby setting the stage for spectacular events before the -Su-
preme Court of the United States later that year.
'Discussed in Galenson and Spector, The New York Anti-In-junction Statute And The Courts (1941) 41 COL. L. REV. 1444. See
(1942) 40 MicH. L. REV. 603.
" S. & W. Fine Foods v. Retail Delivery Drivers & Salesmen's
Union, 11 Wash. (2d) 262, 118 P. (2d) 962 (1941); Heine, Inc. v.
Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, 129 N. J. Eq. 308, 19 A. (2d) 204
(1941).
4
'People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206, 136 A.L.R.
1450 (1941); Mason & Dixon Lines, Inc. v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18
S. E. (2d) 841 (1942); Hydrox Ice Cream Co. v. Doe, 250 App. Div.
770, 293 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1937); Kerns Co. v. Landgraf, 128 N. J.
Eq. 441, 16 A. (2d) 623, 131 A. L. R. 1063 (requesting customers and
the public to refrain from patronizing the employer). Contra:
Borden Co. v. Local Union, 152 S. W. (2d) 828 (Texas, 1941) (pick-
eting of the employer's product at the retail outlet).
'9 Wash. (2d) 507, 115 P. (2d) 662 (1941).
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In the O'Neil case the union was upheld in its attempt to
force by picketing, a sole entrepreneur employing no persons,
to hire union help, the Swinig case being cited as controlling. It
was reasoned that since an employer may be picketed where he
refuses to permit his workers to join a union, it is only one step
further removed to allow a union'to picket a sole entrepreneur
resisting the attempt to force him to employ a union member.
Although the decision was met by public furor, the unions were
wild with joy, forgetting that the holding was merely an expres-
sion of a State tribunal.
Late in 1941 the "Labor dispute" requirement reached the
United States Supreme Court in Wohl v. Bakery & Pastry
Drire's' Local.43 The Court on the first rehearing merely fol-
lowed the line of precedent and reversed a State Court decision
restraining picketing. It did this after finding that no "Labor
dispute" existed because the employer had no persons in his
employ previous to the time of picketing. 44
Oln the second rehearing, 45 Justice Jackson, writing for the
majority, took one of the props from under the New York Labor
Injunction Statute when he said:
"One need not be in a labor dispute as defined by (N. Y.)
state law to have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to
express a grievance in a labor matter by publication, unat-
tended by violence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or
oppressive."
Until that time the New York Courts had required, as a
prerequisite to legal picketing, that there be a Labor dispute be-
"314 U. S. 572 (1941). After first refusing to grant certiorari,
the Court reversed itself and in June, 1941, granted certiorari to the
New York Court of Appeals.
The case concerned a dispute between a union and individual
entrepreneurs. The latter purchased bakery products from whole-
salers and peddled in their own trucks to retail bakeries. The union
sought to force them to employ a union member one day each week
despite the very small earnings of these vendors. The State Supreme
Court enjoined picketing of the vendors, their suppliers, and their
outlets because it was found that no "Labor dispute" existed. The
State Court decisions are reported in 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 198 (Sup. Ct.
1939), aff'd, 259 App. Div. 868, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 811 (1st Dep't 1940),
aff'd 284 N. Y. 788, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940).
"284 N. Y. 788, 31 N. E. (2d) 765 (1940). The New York court
had ample prior authority for its decision and was merely applying
its older decisions to the facts of this new case. Thompson v.
Boekhout, 273 N. Y. 390, 7 N. E. (2d) 674 (1937); Bailis v. Fuchs,
283 N. Y. 133, 27 N. E. (2d) 812 (1940).
-315 U. S. 769 (1942).
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tween the parties. Such "Labor dispute" would, under State
interpretation, exclude any conflict between a union and an
entrepreneur who employed no workers. The Wohl case forced
a widening of that interpretation, 40 and the concurring opinion
by Douglas, joined in by Black and Murphy, added force to the
new definition.
The Wohl and Swing cases would now protect picketing, if
peaceful, in all situations in which Labor considered an em-
ployer to be at fault. A "Labor dispute," strike; or the employ-
er-employee relationship need no longer exist. However, it would
still be possible for a court to use the Meadowmoor decision to
forbid future picketing where the past history showed a bloody
picture. The state of the law was reasonably clear. 47
On -March 30, 1942, The Supreme Court handed down deci-
sions in three picketing cases, Carpenters & Joiners Union of
America v. Ritter's Cafe,48 Allen-Bradley Local, United Elec-
trical, Radio & Machine Workers of America v. Wisconsin Em-
"
0See Luft v. Flove, 270 N. Y. 640, 1 N. E. (2d) 369 (1936).
' Simultaneously with the granting of a motion for a second re-
hearing of the Wohl case, the Supreme Court decided to bring up
for review, three State Court decisions on picketing.
In the first, Hotel & R~staurant Employees' Internat. Alliance
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 437 (1942)
(cert. granted 314 U. S. 590 (1941), the Court warned that by up-
holding a restraining order on picketing, it approved of limitations
upon violent picketing. It held that the State Court's decision on
the interpretation of its own injunction was binding. This injunc-
tion, although only directed against picketing not sanctioned by a
majority vote as required by State law, actually restrained free ex-
pression even if peaceful, where the required majority was not ob-
tainable, the type of injunction torn down by the Swing case.
The second was Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942), brought on ap-
peal from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The union, picketing
the home of non-striking employees, had been enjoined by the State
Court, which asserted that such picketing violated the right to
privacy possessed by every person. This case gave the 'free-
speechers' cause for alarm.
Such picketing of homes had been held to be disorderly conduct
in Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88 (1925); State v. Zarker, 179 Minn. 335
(1930). Cf. Petrucci v. Hogan, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 718 (Sup. Ct., 1941)
and Miller v. Gallagher, 176 Misc. 647, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 606 (Sup. Ct.,
1941).
The third was Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315
U. S. 722 (1942) (cert. to Court of Civil Appeals, Texas, 314 U. S.
595 (1941).
" 315 U. S. 722 (1942).
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ployiiat Relations Board,49 and the second rehearing of the
Wohl case.7"
In the Ritter case, the owner of a restaurant solely employ-
ing union members contracted with a local builder to have con-
structed (on some local property owned by Ritter at the opposite
end of the town) an office building entirely unconnected with
the restaurant. When the builder refused to employ only union
maembers on the building project, the Carpenters and Joiners
Union and the Painters Local Union began to picket both the
project and the restaurant.
The placards used by the pickets told the true story and
did not intimate that the restaurant was unfair to the union.
Since no deliveries would be made by union truckers, and pros-
pective customers feared to cross the picket lines, the business
of the restaurant was greatly reduced.5'.
In light of precedents holding picketing illegal when car-
ried on in the absence of a strike' the State Court permanently
enjoined all union activity against Ritter arising from the con-
troversy. : A rehearing was first denied by the highest Texas
Court, but when the United States Supreme Court, in the Swing
case, invalidated a State Court injunction of picketing issued
on the ground of the absence of a strike, the Texas Court decided
to grant the Ritter case a rehearing.
Upon the rehearing, the Texas Court affirmed its former
decision stating that the local Anti-Trust Act was the basis for
the granting of an injunction of picketing. It maintained that
while the union had no relations at all with Ritter, in the Swing
case, although picketing in the absence of a strike was allowed,
the parties had been more closely related. This reasoning was
weak and seemed to be mere rationalization.
W1hen the 4?itter case came before the United States Su-
preme Court, the injunction was upheld in a 5 to 4 decision. The
majority stated that the guarantee of free speech did not prevent
the confining of picketing to the area of industry in which the
':315 U. S. 740 (1942).
315 U. S. 769, discussed supra.
rt Discussed by situation only in FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE
LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
Cooks, Waiters & Waitresses' Local Union v. Papegeorge, 230
S. W. 1086 (Texas, 1921); Texas Motion Picture & Vitaphone Oper-
ators v. Galveston Motion Picture Operators, 132 S. W. (2d) 299
(Texas, 1939).
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Labor dispute has arisen. The reasoning of the Court would
require the pickets and the one picketed to be in the same or
closely related industries and also share directly interdependent
economic interests. Each industry would be a separate entity
for the purposes of Labor activities. However, this decision is
hardly justifiable in the light of the Swing and Wol cases. If
picketing really constitutes free speech, it should not be enjoined
simply because it is exercised in one place and not in another.
Were picketing to be an exercise of free speech, it could not
validly be enjoined unless there fxisted an inherent danger of
disturbing the communal peace. 3 Applying the traditional test
of justification, we would arrive at a conclusion different from
that of the Supreme Court in the Ritter case.
Assuming that the picketing was for a lawful end, how
could one hold a straight face and still call Ritter a total stranger
to the controversy? .Both the land and the restaurant were his.
Moreover, since he was shown to be a prudent businessman with
past experience in union negotiations applicable to his re-tau-
rant, he may well have been expected to know of the builder's
difficulties with the union. It is said that the builder was an
independent contractor and not an employee of Ritter. This
would make no difference, since under the building contract,
Ritter would have obtained the benefits of substandard labor
conditions through a lower contract price.
The Supreme Court asserted that although secondary pick-
eting was permissible, there being no connection between the
building and the restaurant other than both being owned by the
same individual, and the land and restaurant being geograph-
ically far removed, the picketing was unlawful in its purpose.
For the Court to arrive at such a decision under the facts, it
was necessary to admit a difference between pitketing and free
speech, thereby receding from former holdings that picketing
was free speech. The new theory upheld the emasculated
right to picket only within the area of the primary dispute. The
majority opinion is evidence that picketing is not an absolute
'Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47 (1919) (causing insubordination
in the army); Abrams v. U. S., 250 U. S. 616 (1919) (advocating
armed resistance to the government, especially in time of war);
Gitlow v. N. Y., 268 U. S. 652 (1925) (advocating overthrow of the
government). See also CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THe UNITED STATES
(1941).
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right, to be restricted only when it constitutes a clear and pres-
ent danger to the peace of the community. The dissenters seem
to maintain that the State may have an interest, short of the
prevention of violence, which warrants reasonable restrictions.54
Justices Black and Reed, in their dissents, 5 5 point out that
the sole requisite for a relationship between the pickets and the
one picketed should be that the facts relate to the picketed per-
sons, i. e., the one picketed would be connected with the contro-
versy if the disseminated facts truthfully accuse him. directly or
indirectly, of violating some interest of the union. Using this
test, Ritter would indeed be implicated in the controversy. ',
The decision of the Supreme Court was based upon the
State's right to insulate from a Labor dispute, any establishment
lacking an industrial connection to the dispute.57 After the
decision was handed down, the Bench and Bar attempted in vain
to discover why peaceful picketing was denied in the Ritter case
and protected in the Wohl case.
Free speech camot exist where peaceful discussion is en-
joinable whenever a court dislikes the subject matter. In the
Wohl case the Supreme Court asserted that the injunction would
have been upheld had the picketing been for an unlawful pur-
pose. It was said that picketing could also be enjoined where its
purpose is one not considered valid by the Court in the best
interests of the community. Would any speech, not made during
picketing activities, be so restricted were a court to find that it
would not serve a valid end? In the absence of violence or sub-
versiveness, probably not. It is reasonable to infer that the Court
in the Wold case was conscious of a difference between picketing
and free speech.
Since the Court would permit picketing to be enjoined
where the end was unlawful, the Wohl case does not go as far
as some have thought, in the direction of protecting Labor's
' See Justice Brandeis dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S.
312, 372 (1921) and Justice Brandeis writing for the majority in both
Dorchy v. Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 (1926) and Senn v. Tile Layers
Protective Union, supra.
'Z-Justices Douglas and Murphy concurred in the dissent by
Justice Black while Justice Reed dissented in a separate opinion.
-1 See FREY, CASES ON LABOR LAW (1941) 239-273; Galenson and
Spector, The New York Labor-Injunction Statute and the Courts
(1942) 42 COL. L. REV. 51, 68-71.
- 315 U. S. 722, 727 (1942).
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right to picket. The Court there places the right to picket directly
under the State Court determination and merely reaffirms the
proposition that where a State Court finds the purpose of the
picketing to be unlawful, the Supreme Court has the power of
full review. It was merely decided that under the particular
facts, the purpose and the means used were entirely lawful and
could not be enjoined. By taking this view of the Wold case, we
find that it was not as great a boon to Labor as had previously
been thought, and most important of all, it provided background
for the Ritter case. It is reasonable to conclude that the Ritter
case did not upset the law concerning picketing as known toward
the close of the 1940 Supreme Court term, but merely carried
on the Wold case.
Such would be the correct way to reconcile the Wol and
Ritter cases without asserting that the Court completely re-
versed itself on the feeling toward the picketing-free speech
identification. This view enables us to carry a straight line di-
rectly from the Senn case to the Ritter case by concluding that
picketing has a close relation to free speech, but not being free
speech itself, merely an adjunct, it is, subject to valid restrictions
not applicable to the pure right of free speech itself.
There are additional instances in which the Supreme Court
has not considered picketing and free speech as one and the
same. In the Alleiz-Bradley cas e s the Supreme Court upheld
a State injunction which forbade picketing of the homes of non-
striking employees of an "unfair" employer. Were picketing
to be pure free speech and enjoy Constitutional protection, it
would seem improper to enjoin peaceful picketing of an em-
ployee's home. However, by returning to the older theory that
picketing is in the nature of a prima facie tort, a court may
enjoin where, by balancing the conveniences, the right to privacy
of the non-striking employee is found more important than the
right to picket.59
We know of the existence of permissible restrictions upon
ordinary free speech such as that used for commercial purposes
11 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Board, 315 U. S. 740 (1942), cited and discussed supra note 47.
In this connection see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
"Cf. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1941) 405-
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and indecent language.13  Were picketing and free speech one
and the same, the only valid restrictions upon the former would
be those imposed upon all speech.
Douglas, concurring in the Wolh case, asserted that picket-
ing was not only a mere use of the right of physical discussion,
but was a form of pressure, stronger than the pressure of pure
verbal discussion. This seems to be a distinction of degree. He
quotes freely from the Torak ill case, pointing out that picket-
ilm is coercive and has the potentiality of inducing active or
passive cooperation by the hearing public. He then explains
the necessity for restrictions by saying:
"Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very
presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or
another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are
being disseminated. Hence those aspects of picketing make it
the subject of restrictive regulation."'
Picketing is rarely quiet and implies the possible threat of
intimidation. In larger strikes, the union leadership often
finds difficulty in keeping the activity within bounds of peace-
fulness. A number of pickets are usually on hand and their pro-
cedure is to direct words to the passerby in an attempt to arouse
sympathy for the cause or to embarrass prospective customers
into a sense of shame or fear. Such is Labor's weapon ! The picket
line serves the useful purpose of discouraging union sympa-
thizers from entering the premises. This greatly decreases the
number of customers. The line informs other union men of
the conflict and often results in their refusal to deal with the
employer until the dispute is settled, presumably in favor of
the employees.'13
Seldom does a picketed employer resort to counter picket-
ing. This would merely throw more light on the conflict, a
situation which the employer rarely desires. In recent years,
however, everyone has seen the signs placed in windows of
'See Bridges v. California, 314 U. S. 252 (1941); Schneider v.
State, 308 U. S. 147 (1939), Hargue v. C. I. 0. 296 (1940. Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U. S. 568 (1942) and Valentine v. Christensen,
316 U. S. 52 (1942) are helpful in pointing out the valid restrictions
which have been placed upon the right of free speech by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
See note 53 supra.
" 315 U. S. at 776.
" This result takes place where both unions are in harmony and
are not involved in a jurisdictional dispute.
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picketed establishments reading "Our Workers Are Not On
Strike" or "Our Employees Belong To Local Union No ...........
A.F.L." Such measures of counter picketing have been utilized
where the unions are engaged in unionization campaigns of
shops wherein the then employed workers and their employer
were resisting the campaign. In business, with its resultant
competition, customers need not risk crossing a picket line, and
can readily deal with another establishment at less danger.13
There is little discussion involved in the usual picketing
scene, but rather a threat of coercion, not a presentation of the
facts to the consumer leaving to his fairness the ultimate
decision. It is really a one sided showing of force to the
prospective customer with little deciding for him to do except
whether or not to risk the wrath of the pickets. 4
Once it is decided that picketing is not a complete exercise
of the right to free speech, but merely akin to free speech and
a form of economic pressure, the law of Torts is applicable.
A valid and lawful purpose could then be required as a prere-
quisite to picketing. Using Torts rules, most secondary picket-
ing and boycotts could be forbidden, 65 and the courts would be
empowered to restrict picketing to certain situations, much as
was done in the Ritter case. 60 Courts have usually enjoined
tortious speech, although refusing to do so in the case of a pure
slander or libel.
While the Restatement of Torts accords to peaceful picket-
ing a wide area of permissibility, 67 it seems quite clear that
the activity of picketing is not identified wth free speech under
the Restatement formulation. The legality of picketing as
stated therein, depends upon the particular object sought to
'FRANKFURTER & GREENE, Op. cit. supra note 51, 25-27; Peter-
son, Extent of Collective Bargaining At The Beginning Of 19J2
(1942) 54 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 1066.
'Fischer, Trade Unions Under The Wagner Act (1941) 21 ORE.
L. RE V. 37. A wealth of information concerning Labor activities
during strikes is found in Hellerstein, Picketing Legislation And The
Courts (1931) 10 N.C.L. REV. 158.
CZWhere picketing was carried on against one who had dealt
with the "unfair" employer, not knowing of the dispute.
I See Wood Mowing and Reaping Machine Co. v. Toohey, 114
Misc. 185, 221 N. Y. S. 95 (Sup. Ct., 1921) where the court in com-
menting upon its holding that peaceful picketing was legal in that
case said: "This is sound. It is the law. It must forever remain the
law until liberty of speech ceases to be a human right."
"
7RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1939) §§ 779, 781, 783, 798-801.
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be obtained.' 8 Picketing, even if peaceful, is termed illegal by
the Restatement in several additional circumstances, viz, where
a union is engaged in a dispute with a wholesaler and the union
pickets a retailer who buys from this wholesaler, seeking to
persuade consumers to refrain from purchasing from that re-
tailer not merely the goods of the "unfair" wholesaler but all
merchandise offered for sale by the retailer.69
Another incident of unlawful picketing, according to the
Restatement, would be where the retailer, though promising
not to purchase further goods from the "unfair" wholesaler," o
is picketed because he insists upon selling such of the whole-
saler's product as he had on hand at the time he learned of
the dispute. 71 A similar case is found, where the manufacturer's
supplier of raw materials (the manufacturer selling his product
to the "unfair" wholesaler) is picketed by union members who
desire the supplier to cease selling his product to the manufac-
turer not only for the purpose of stifling the wholesaler who
is being "unfair," but also to coerce the manufacturer who
refused to assist the union in its struggle with the wholesaler.72
The connections of the ones picketed to the "unfair" whole-
saler are considered remote, it all being a matter of degree.
We have seen that the right to free speech is not absolute;
the right to indulge in conduct which is speech anzd something
More is still less absolute, as was indicated by Justice Frank-
furter in the Rlifter case. However, a prohibition upon picketing
still is, under certain circumstances, an infringement of the
right to free speech.
Whether the picketing is constitutionally privileged often
depends upon many facts, such as the place at which it is car-
I ld. at § 779b.
In New York, a State which looks with patience upon second-
ary picketing and boycotts, the activities may be directed only
against the unfair product and not against the entire business of the
person suffering from the secondary activity. Goldfinger v. Feintuch,
276 N. Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910, 116 A. L. R. 447 (1937).
R ESTATEMENT, ToRTS (1939) § 779b.
Id. at § 801, Illust. 2, and § 801 c.
7'Id. at § 801 c, d.
See United States v. Railway Employees' Dept. of A.F.L., 283
Fed. 479 (N. D. Ill. 1922) and Hotel, Restaurant & Soda Fountain
Employees' Union v. Miller, 272 Ky. 466 (1938).
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tied on.73 Such speech as is speech and vothing more, may be
granted or denied constitutional protection according to wkzvrc
it takes place. An example is the refusal by the courts to
throw the cloak of Constitutional privilege upon the distri-
bution of advertisements upon the streets, 7 4 although few courts
would deny the right to advertise in the newspapers and through
other conventional media.
Were the older theory of picketing terming it a prima
facie tort excusable upon the showing of just purpose and
lawful means, 7  to be the theory today (especially after the
Seniz, Meadownoor, Thornhill, and Carlson cases), we would
not have progressed at all.7 6
A number of States have held that many of the means
employed in picketing are unlawful although used in futher-
ance of a lawful purpose. Where the means are found lawful,
however, the propriety of the purpose may still be closely
scrutinized,7 7 according to the dictuim of the Wold case.
Despite the foregoing, there has not been, as yet, a
complete break between free speech and picketing. It is evi-
dent that the Supreme Court still believed, diring and after
the Rifler case, that picketing warranted some of the free speech
protections, although by no means all.7s The Wol and Ritter
'See the Ritter case.
The Allen-Bradley case, supra, restricts peaceful picketing out-
side the homes of non-striking employees.
"'Most municipalities, by ordinance, require a permit for such
commercial distribution. See the discussion of Handbill Ordinances
in Part One.
See Part One of this paper.
' Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 171 N. Y. 384, 64 N. E. 163, 59
L. R. A. 310 (1902); Hitchman Coal Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229
(1917). Cf. Farquhar Co. v. National Harrow Co., 102 Fed. 714
(C.C.A. 3rd, 1900) and Dehydro Inc. v. Tretolite Co., 53 F. (2d) 273
(N. D. Okla. 1931).
,
7Steinart & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 207 Mass. 394 (1911); Wilner v.
Bless, 243 N. Y. 544, 154 N. E. 598 (1926). In Fox v. State of Wash-
-ington, 236 U. S. 273 (1915) the Court held that there was no free
speech protection of words advising violations of the law and
violence.
8In People v. Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206 (1941)
the majority, speaking through Lehman, Ch. J., asserted that:
"Peaceful picketing by the members of a union in front of a business
served by the union is the exercise of a right of free speech guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the United States." Lehman cites as
authority the Swing and Wohl cases.
The minority, speaking through Finch, J., also identified picket-
ing with free speech: "Assuming that the right to picket is entitled
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cases terminated the extension of the full identification and
in part returned to the States the power to enjoin picketing
where the means or the objective is unlawful3 9  However, this
power is still reviewable by the Federal Judiciary. The Federal
requirements are built upon the theory that picketing is akin
to free speech and may only be enjoined when it oversteps
certain bounds. The presumption is in favor of lawfulness,
and therefore, the burden of proof rests heavily upon the pro-
ponent of the injunction.
Since picketing is no longer a prima facie tort requiring
justification by the opponent of an injunction, we are not back
to where we were prior to the Sen n case. We have progressed
far indeed, to where all picketing is allowed unless there is evi-
dence sufficient to show the unlawfulness of the means or
the end. "
Were a State to deprive a union of its right to strike and
to picket for higher wages, shorter hours, or better working
conditions, s1 it is certain that the Supreme Court would not
sit complacently by without stopping such a violation of basic
rights. It is conjecture as to the reaction which would meet
an injunction of picketing granted because the end sought was
a closed shop, union recognition where a recent certification
to no less rights than we give to the right to free speech (Cf. Amer-
ican Federation Of Labor v. Swing, supra; Bakery & Pastry Drivers
Local No. 802 v. Wohi, supra), by the same token, an abuse of the
right of free speech would likewise be an abuse of picketing. It has
been repeatedly held that the constitutional rights of freedom of
speech are not absolute and are subject to such reasonable regula-
tions as are necessary to promote and preserve the public peace... "
It is thus seen that the minority agreed with the majority that pick-
eting and free speech were almost akin. From their premises, how-
ever, they reasoned that even such free speech was subject to rea-
sonable regulation.
' See I TELLER, LABOR DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
(1940) §§ 14-18.
"Unlawful end as shown in the Allen-Bradley case, supra. This
case and the Ritter case are often cited as involving unlawful means.
In the Wohl case an injunction was refused because both the end
and the means used to obtain that end were lawful.
" These objectives usually cause most strikes. A recent addition,
emphasized by the War, is a strike because a union member has been
discharged, or where the union seeks the discharge of a shop
steward.
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had been given to a rival union,"' or in a controversy with an
employer over the use of mechanical instruments. s
In the future, it is probable that the courts will give
thought to the social and economic ingredients of a Labor dis-
pute before terming the purpose illegal and enjoining all
activity.
In the Wohk case, Justice Jackson had asserted that a union
could picket even in the absence of a legally defined Labor
dispute. He was quick to insist, however, that where the dis-
pute concerned an unlawful objective, the picketing was en-
joinableS4 Therefore, the criterion set up by the New York
Courts in requiring a Labor dispute to exist before the right
to picket ensued, was eliminated.
The State Anti-Injunction statutes are intended to pre-
scribe the procedural and not the substantive law for the
issuance of Labor injunctions.8 A great number of courts have
asserted that there can be no Labor dispute where the object
is an unlawful one.s 6 Therefore, since picketing to attain an
unlawful objective may, in itself, be enjoined according to the
dicta of the Ritter and Wohl cases,8 7 and the State Courts en-
joined picketing in the absence of proof of a "Labor dispute,"
There is an insufficient number of cases to denote a trend.
s' In Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. (2d)
349, 136 A.L.R. 267 (1941), cert. denied 314 U. S. 615 (1941), rehear-
ing denied 314 U. S. 716 (1941), the New York Court of Appeals
approved an injunction of a secondary strike instituted to force
Plaintiff to cease using mechanical musical instruments in place
of live musicians. The Court called the union's objective "unlawful"
and asserted that the use of a lawful Labor means, namely the
strike, cannot make valid the illegal objective herein sought.
'"He said, at page 774:
"So far as we can ascertain from the opinions delivered by
the state courts in this case, those courts were concerned only
with the question whether there was involved a labor dispute
within the meaning of the New York statutes and assumed that
the legality of the injunction followed from a determination that
such a dispute was not involved. Of course that does not follow:
one need not be in a "labor dispute" as defined by state law to
have a right under the Fourteenth Amendment to express a
grievance in a labor matter by publication unattended by vio-
lence, coercion, or conduct otherwise unlawful or oppressive."
'For further discussion see (1942) 40 MIcH. L. REV. 603 and
(1941) 28 VA. L. REV. 105.
'Particularly the New York and Oregon Courts.
' This phase of the Wohl case is discussed, supra.
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there seemed to be a two-pronged weapon for use against the
uniolnS. ,
In the Wold case, the Supreme Court pointed out that since
the State Court had not shown its reasons for refusing to term
the conflict a "Labor dispute," any doubt would have to be
resolved in favor of legality of the objective, existence of a
"Labor dispute" and the resultant validity of the picketing
where peaceful, all contra to the findings of the State Court.s 9
Thus the State Courts, in later cases involving Anti-injunction
statutes, found it advisable to give reasons, making them as
strong" as possible, for refusing to call the controversy a "Labor
dispute.''", This resulted in their findings receiving a pre-
sumption of correctness upon review.91
"Labor dispute" has been defined by usage as a conflict
which does not run counter in its objective to the desirable
social and economic policies of the commuunAy_ Since the Ritter
ease and despite the previous cases, it seems that the State
Courts have the first and most often the final opportunity to
decide what is a desirable social and economic policy. Except
in situations of flagrant abuse of this power, the decisions of the
State Courts are usually final.0 2
-Discussed fully in Galenson & Spector, supra note 56, at 51.
See also (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 1444.
Cf. Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N. Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 116
A.L.R. 477 (1937); Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N. Y. 348, 34
N. E. (2d) 349 (1941), cert. denied 314 U. S. 615 (1941), rehearing
denied 314 U. S. 716 (1941); Penn. R. R. Co. v. U. S. Railroad Labor
Board, 261 U. S. 72 (1922).
'This principle of law is designed to prevent arbitrary decisions
and to provide the reviewing tribunal with the proper and required
materials for the review.
Of interest on the point are Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail
Employees' Union, 281 N. Y. 150, 22 N. E. (2d) 320 (1939), and
Schwab v. Moving Picture Machine Operator's Local, 165 Ore. 602,
109 P. (2d) 600 (1941).
"This matter is more fully discussed in Crothers, The Anti-
Injunction Acts And Our State Constitutions (1941) 21 ORE. L. REV.
63.
See also WITTE, THE GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DISPUTES (1932) 17
and Teller, Focal Problems In American Labor Law-Opera On
Tour, Inc. v. Weber (1942) 28 VA. L. REV. 727.
Cf. (1937) 37 COL. L. REEV. 1227 for a brief discussion of the
New York and other anti-injunction statutes prior to 1937.
" The most recent cases involving a statute requiring a "Labor
dispute" were the two Cafeteria cases, see supra note 106, based upon
the New York C.P.A. § 876-a.
"'See Lauf v. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S. 323 (1938); Mason &
Dixon Lines v. Odom, 193 Ga. 471, 18 S.E. (2d) 841 (1942).
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In Bridges v. California93 the Court showed its preference
for legislative restraints on Labor activities as against the
common law type. By so asserting, the Court focused attention
upon the difference in importance between Labor policy as
declared by statute and as set down at common law.' 4
Since a statute, more readily than common law, expresses
the sentiments of the people of today, (unless the common law
was found in a recent case) where all things are equal, a court
is more apt to sustain an interference with picketing or with
non-picketing free speech when that restriction emanates from
a statute.95
It was not merely coincidence that in the Swing case, the
Supreme Court prefaced its holding that the State Court in-
junction against picketing was invalid, by pointing out that
this lower tribunal had based its action upon the common lawY'
314 U. S. 252 (1941).
Id. at 260, the Court said: "The problem is different where thejudgment is based on a common law concept of the most general
and undefined nature. For here the legislature of California has not
appraised a particular kind of situation and found a specific danger
sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on a particular kind of
utterance. The judgments below, therefore, do not come to us en-
cased in the armor wrought by prior legislative deliberation."
'The benefit of statute as against common law has long been a
controversial question. The arguments for and against case law as
opposed to code law are directly applicable.
It has been pointed out that since it is axiomatic (not all courts
put it this strongly) that a court does not make law but merely finds
the existing law, the sentiments of common law are of the people
of yesterday.
It is also true that a statute is passed by the people's represen-
tatives in legislatures assembled, while common law is asserted by ajudicial officer who personally decides all questions of law.
See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940). Also shedding
some light on this situation is Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U. S. 496 (1939)(enjoining the enforcement of a local ordinance forbidding all
public assembly in streets or parks of the city without a permit).
Cf. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U. S. 43 (1897), where the court
upheld a local ordinance prohibiting persons from speaking on
public property within the City of Boston unless a permit had first
been obtained from a city official.
"A.F.L. v. Swing, 312 U. S. 321 (1941). At page 323 the court
says:
"More thorough study of the record and full argument have
reduced the issue to this: is the constitutional guaranty of free-
dom of discussion infringed by the common law policy of a state
forbidding resort to peaceful persuasion through picketing
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A year later, in the very next case of note, the majority of
the Supreme Court approved of a State Court injunction of
picketing in the Ritter case based upon a State statute25 In
others such as the Allen-Bradley case, the Court upheld injunc-
tions, although not doing so specifically upon the basis of a
statute as opposed to common law. The cases already decided,
however, do not permit the formulation of a definite rule but
merely a trend. Therefore it would be impossible to say with
impunity that a State may, by statute, outlaw picketing carried
on in the absence of a strikeYs
What the State Courts will do where their respective States
have not, by statute, declared the public policy toward Labor,
is to be seen. Without such statutes it is reasonable to expect
that judges will do as the Texas Court did in the Ritter case,
expand an existing statute, (the State Anti-Trust Laws in that
instance) and adapt it to the Labor situation. 9
merely because there is no immediate employer-employee
dispute."
At page 325 the court continues:
"We are asked to sustain a decree which for purposes of
this case asserts as the common law of a state that there can be
no 'peaceful picketing or peaceful persuasion' in relation to any
dispute between an employer and a trade union unless the em-
ployer's own employees are in controversy with him."
' The majority opinions in the Swing and Ritter cases were
written by Justice Frankfurter. In the latter case, however, Justices
Black and Douglas were among the dissenters, whereas in the former
they had concurred with the result reached by the majority.
" See Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Milk & IceCream Drivers & Dairy Employees Union, 238 Wis. 379, 299 N. W. 31(1941); Carpenter Baking Co. v. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union,
237 Wis. 24, 296 N. W. 118 (1941), aff'd 238 Wis. 367, 299 N. W. 30(1941), rehearing denied, 238 Wis. 367, 300 N. W. 225 (1941), cert.
denied, 315 U. S. 817 (1942).
An interesting discussion of the problem is found in (1942) 40
MicH. L. REv. 1200.
" The dissent by Black, concurred in by Douglas and Murphy,
points this out in saying, at page 729:
"It is clear from the opinion of the Texas Court Of Civil
Appeals that the injunction against picketing was granted notbecause of any law directly aimed at picketing as such-Texas
has no statute against picketing-nor to prevent violence, dis-
order, breach of peace, or congestion of the streets. The im-
mediate purpose of the injunction was to frustrate the union's
objective of conveying information to that part of the public
which came near the respondent's place of business, an objective
which the court below decided was a violation of Texas anti-
trust laws."
L. J.-3
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Where there is a statutory declaration of public policy
toward Labor activities, the Supreme Court may not wish to
review the expressions of the State policy making body unless
grossly unreasonable.' 00  It is the opinion of some writers that
a most recent trend of the Supreme Court has been to shy
away from any position which would require the sitting as a
super-administrative body or as a super-legislature." 1  The
followers on the High Court of Chief Justice Stone seem to feel
that where a legislative or administrative organ has decided a
matter of detail, it is not a function of the Court to re-examine
the entire factual basis for that decision.1" '
In view of the swing toward finality of State determina-
tion as was seen in the Ritter case, this recent trend of the
Supreme Court is significant. 0 3 It may be that upon the
conclusion of the present War Emergency, 04 a large amount
of the field of Labor relations will be returned to the juris-
diction of the States for final determination excepting in the
rare situation where the High Court will find it necessary to
'Although courts of review leave the question of weight of
evidence to juries or lower courts, the higher tribunal often attempts
to see that a reasonable non-arbitrary view was taken. Therefore
the tribunal will look at the statute in all cases where its unreason-
ableness has been imputed, and determine if it is prima facie rea-
sonable and not arbitrary. However, under the more recent theory,
policy as declared by the legislature or administrative body is final
in the absence of violation of basic constitutional safeguards.
'Found to be quite interesting is E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing
And Free Speech: A Dissent (1943) 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 which takes
issue with conclusions reached in Teller, Picketing And Free Speech
(1942) 56 HARV. L. REv. 180.
' This view is intimated in Teller, Picketing And Free Speech:
A Reply (1943) 56 HARV. L. REV. 532.
See also R. H. White Co. v. Murphy, 310 Mass. 510, 38 N. E. (2d)
685 (1942). Cf. Stillwell Theatre Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N. Y. 405, 182
N. E. 63, 84 A.L.R. 6 (1932).
The New York Anti-Injunction Law is discussed and analyzed
in the Court of Appeals decision in Florsheim Shoe Store Co. v. Re-
tail Shoe Salesmen's Union, 288 N. Y. 188, 42 N. E. (2d) 480 (1942).
"' Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Everett District Council of Lum-
ber & Saw Mill Workers, 11 Wash. (2d) 503, 119 P. (2d) 643 (1941).
Cf. Bloedel Donovan Lumber Mills v. International Woodworkers of
America, 4 Wash. (2d) 62, 102 P. (2d) 270 (1940).
" The War Emergency makes it preferable from the point of
view ,of orderly Federal Government) for the Federal Courts to stand
ready to review and finally determine most labor controversies
reaching the courts.
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invalidate a State decision because of overreaching.O 5 Adher-
ence to the more recent view is aptly demonstrated in the two
most recent cases of interest concerning picketing, the so called
Cafcteria cases.1"6  Reading the opinion of Justice Frankfurter,
we imagine ourselves returned to the days of 1940.107
In the first case, the union had peacefully picketed the
respondent's cafeteria carrying signs "which tended to give
the impression that the respondents were 'unfair' to organized
labor and that the 'strikers' had been previously employed in
the cafeteria." The pickets had informed prospective customers
that the cafeteria served bad food and that "by patronizing it
they were aiding the cause of fascism." Actually, the pickets
had never been employed by the respondents.
The circumstances of the second case were quite similar
to the first except that prospective customers were insulted and
informed by the pickets that a strike of employees was in pro-
gress. The State Court ruled that since the pickets had never
been employed at the cafeteria, no strike was in progress, no
"Labor dispute" existed, and there was a threat of irrepar-
able damage.l ' s An injunction was granted in each ease for-
" See Schuster v. International Association, 293 Ill. App. 177, 12
N. E. (2d) 50 (1938); Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72 v. Fur Work-
ers Union, 105 F. (2d) 1 (App. D.C. 1939), affd 308 U. S. 522 (1939).
A number of writers, in recent years, have maintained that there
is not now a uniform Labor policy in the United States Supreme
Court. See Teller, Picketing and Free Speech (1942) 56 HARv. L.
REv. 180 and Schlesinger, Repressive Legislation: An Analysis of the
Smith Bill (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 7. These writers have cited com-
paratively recent cases to support this view. United States v.
Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219 (1941) (indictment under the Sherman
Act); United States v. Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners, 313 U. S.539 (1941), affirming a decision of an Illinois District Court; United
States v. International Hod Carriers' & Common Laborers' District
Council, 313 U. S. 539 (1941), affirming a decision of an Illinois Dis-
trict Court; United States v. Building & Construction Trade Council,
313 U. S. 539 (1941), affirming a decision of a Louisiana District
Court.
"'Cafeteria Employees Union v. Gus Angelos (Case Number 36)
and Cafeteria Employees Union v. Elias Tsakires (Case Number 37)joined by the Supreme Court in one opinion at 320 U. S. 293 (1943).
" Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940) and Carlson v. Cali-
fornia, 310 U. S. 106 (1940).
' Such findings were based upon the New York analogue of the
Norris LaGuardia Act, C.P.A. § 876-a.
Asserting the same principle, see Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.
Y. 281, 11 N. E. (2d) 910, 116 A. L. R. 477 (1937) and People v.
Muller, 286 N. Y. 281, 36 N. E. (2d) 206, 136 A. L. R. 1450 (1941).
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bidding all picketing in the vicinity of the cafeterias."'
The Supreme Court treats the matter as similar in prin-
ciple to the Swing case, Justice Frankfurter stating:
"The Court here, as in the Swing case, was probably led into
error by assuming that if a controversy does not come within the
scope of state legislation limiting the issue of injunctions, efforts
to make known one side of an industrial controversy by peace-
ful means may be enjoined.
"A state cannot exclude working men in a particular in-
dustry from putting their case to the public in a peaceful way
'by drawing the circle of economic competition between em-
ployers and workers so small as to contain only an employer
and those directly employed by him.""'
For precedent Justice Frankfurter also reaches back and
grasps the Senn case,"' citing it continuously in the discussion
of free speech and pointing out that although that case had
pr6tected only such picketing as was peaceful and truthful,
the publicity in the Cafeteria cases met these requirements since
such terms as "Fascism" and "unfair" are merely part of the
give and take of a Labor controversy. 112  He firml- asserts,
however, that the cloak of Constitutional protection may not
be donned by conduct which goes beyond the simple coercive
influence exerted by picketing devoid of violence and threats
of such violence. This reminds one of the Carlson and
Thornhill cases.
In view of the holding in the Cafeteria cases, it may well
be said that the Supreme Court has returned to a position where
it will nullify State injunctions infringing upon the picketing
free speech identification. To what degree the Court will keel)
to the line dotted by the Senn, Carlson, Thornh ill, inblg and
Cafo-'eria cases, 113 or to what degree the Court will switch to
"' The lower court decision was affirmed in 264 App. Div. 708, 34
N. Y. S. (2d) 408 (1942), aff'd 289 N. Y. 498, 46 N.E. (2d) 903 (1943).
In the Appellate Division two Justices dissented while in the Court
of Appeals dissents were noted by Chief Judge Lehman and two
associates.
" At this point, Justice Frankfurter is quoting from A.F.L. v.
Swing, 312 U. S. at 326.
"n Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468 (1937).
n This matter was brought out quite fully in 1 TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1940).
n Liberal interpretation of the picketing-free speech identifica-
tion resulting in a number of Labor activities being protecting as
akin to the exercise of free speech.
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the line begun by the Ritter ease 14 and its followers, is pure
conjecture at present.
It is reasoned that the more flagrant the curtailment of
eivil rights threatened by the injunction, the more prompt will
the Court be in adopting a strict interpretation toward the
identification and in closely scrutinizing actions of the State
Courts. When the matter is merely one of interpretation of a
statute which may or may not be reasonable, depending upon
a matter of "degree," the Court may be expected to follow
the rule of liberal interpretation in favor of the State.
The story which comprehends the nature and consequently
the extent of the protection afforded to the practice of picketing
is one which, like a serial, may be expected to unfold in future
years.
The use by the United States Supreme Court, both in the
Thorhill and in the Carlson cases, of the term "picketing" in
quotation marks and the termination of this practice in later
ea ses, as well as the Court's viewpoint that picketing may mean
one of several things, is a large part of the present uncertainty
regarding picketing. The extreme delicacy and seeming fond-
nes,, with which the Supreme Court and the Courts of numerous
States have emphasized the right of a State to regulate the
means of exerting economic pressure is an indication of the
numerous problems which future Labor statutes will raise.
Whether the State Courts or the Supreme Court will have
the final word in matters concerning the propriety of Labor
methods, is a question the answer to which has been going back
and forth in pendulum fashion. Where the authority will fin-
ally come to rest is a matter of pure conjecture which can only
be made certain by a line of strong future decisions of the
Supreme Court.
'Strict interpretation of the identification so as to envelop few
Labor activities with the protection. This line of cases often as-
serts the identification, but finding loopholes, decides that the facts
of the instant case do not warrant the protection. One may include
the Wohl Case in this category.
